Introduction
There has been extensive debate on the economic role of bank competition. Whereas one might expect consensual evidence in favor of positive effects through consumer benefits and better access to credit (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004) , there is a burgeoning literature showing that increased competition in banking might be detrimental for the economy since it tends to hamper banking stability (e.g. Berger, Klapper and TurkAriss, 2009; Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens, 2013 ).
Yet another important effect of bank competition may reside in the transmission of monetary policy via the bank lending channel. Namely, we wonder if the degree of bank competition influences the effectiveness of monetary policy by favoring or hampering the transmission of monetary policy decisions. This issue is of particular interest within the euro area, as the degree of bank competition (Carbo et al., 2009; ECB, 2010 ) and the loan rates vary markedly across the countries 1 , in the midst of the single monetary policy.
The bank lending channel is based on the idea that when banks face a funding shock in connection with monetary tightening, the shock will be transmitted to the supply of bank loans if the banks cannot replace their liabilities with other external sources of funding such as money market funds. As a consequence, monetary policy exerts an impact on real activity also through the supply of bank loans. This real effect is particularly important if firms are highly dependent on bank loans. In the case of imperfect substitutability between bank loans and bonds, the reduction in the supply of bank loans has a larger effect on real activity.
Bank competition can alter the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel. If a bank lending channel exists, monetary tightening may force some banks to reduce their supply of loans. These reductions will however differ across banks.
Banks with less access to alternative funding sources would probably be hit harder and thus cut their lending more than the other banks. Access to alternative funding sources may depend not only on individual bank characteristics such as bank size, capitalization and liquidity, but also on the structure of the banking sector and the market power of the individual financial institutions. If the level of bank competition is lower, banks are expected 1 EU Commission provides information on the interest rates charged on loans up to 1 million euro for all EU countries. The average loan rates in 2006 in euro area countries ranged from 4.11% in Austria to 6.24% in Portugal.
(http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/finance/data/enterprise-finance-index/access-to-financeindicators/loans/index_en.htm).
Zuzana Fungáčová, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill Does bank competition influence the lending channel in the euro area? 6 to have easier access to alternative sources of funding like certificates of deposit or interbank loans. The assumption of a positive relation between ease of access to alternative funding and bank competition is readily backed by empirical evidence of the greater market power of banks with higher profitability and lower probability of failure.
2
The bank lending channel has been extensively investigated inside Europe (e.g. Altunbas, Fazylov and Molyneux, 2002; Gambacorta, 2005) and outside (e.g. Kishan and Opiela, 2000) . It is of particular interest for European countries, as the financing of firms by bank loans is clearly more predominant in Europe than in the US. 3 However, the role of bank competition in influencing the lending channel has been widely ignored in the literature, and has never been investigated for Europe. We are only aware of three related works. Adams and Amel (2005) analyze the role of bank competition in the bank lending channel by looking at how banking sector competition influences the supply of lending to small businesses. The study is based on aggregate regional US data. Using a concentration measure, the Herfindahl index, to measure competition, they find that greater bank concentration amplifies monetary policy transmission. Olivero, Li and Jeon (2011a, b) investigate whether bank competition influences the bank lending channel for a sample of developing countries in Asia and Latin America. The studies differ as to the competition measure: the first one uses two concentration indices (market share of the five largest banks and Herfindahl index) and the second applies the Rosse-Panzar measure. They also differ in terms of findings: the first provides evidence that greater concentration (less competition) weakens the bank lending channel, the second that greater competition weakens the transmission of monetary policy.
Our aim in this study is to investigate how bank competition affects the bank lending channel in the euro area countries. We use a panel dataset of banks from 12 "old" member countries of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) covering the period from 2002 to 2010. This setting suits our investigation, as monetary policy is the same in all these countries whereas the level of bank competition differs, and this enables us to clearly identify the role of bank competition. We analyze the reaction of loan supply to monetary policy actions following the methodology by Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) . According 2 In line with the theoretical work of Keeley (1990), Fungacova and Weill (2013) show that greater market power reduces the occurrence of failures in the banking industry, while Turk-Ariss (2010) finds a positive relation between bank market power and financial stability. 3 European Banking Federation reports that the ratio of bank assets to GDP in 2010 stood at 349% in Europe and 78% in the US. Bank loans accounted for 144% of GDP in Europe while the corresponding figure for the US was 45% (http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/uploads/Facts%20&%20Figures%202011.pdf). reductions in loan supply for small banks. These banks are more dependent on deposits and, being less liquid, they cannot protect their loan portfolios by reducing their liquid assets and, being less well capitalized, they have less access to uninsured funding. In this paper we explore whether the bank lending channel is also shaped by bank market power as well as by traditional bank characteristics (size, liquidity, capitalization). We consider the interaction between bank competition and monetary policy in order to study whether bank competition influences the transmission of monetary policy in the euro area. We measure bank competition by the Lerner index, which is a bank-specific measure of competition.
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Our evidence thus advances the understanding of the effectiveness of monetary policy in the euro area by being the first study devoted to the impact of bank competition on the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel in the euro area countries. Nevertheless, the relevance of our results is much broader since, unlike earlier papers dealing with this issue, we use the Lerner index to measure bank competition. This measure has several major advantages over the earlier approaches. Neither the concentration indices nor the Herfindahl index are exact measures of competition. They instead infer the degree of competition from indirect proxies such as market share by assuming that greater market share is associated with greater market power or that concentration is negatively correlated with competition, which may not be the case. The new empirical industrial organization literature provides competition measures that directly quantify the competitive behaviour of banks. The Rosse-Panzar measure, adopted in Olivero, Li and Jeon (2011b) , is one such measure. As pointed out by Shaffer (2004) , this indicator is a measure of competition useful only for diagnosing the type of market structure (e.g. monopolistic competition or perfect competition). It cannot be considered a continuous measure of competition with greater values meaning higher levels of competition.
Compared to concentration indices and the Rosse-Panzar measure, all of which are aggregate measures of competition, the Lerner index has the advantage of being a bank-level measure of competition. This characteristic is important, as banking markets may be local in nature, which renders it difficult to measure competition at the country level. Moreover when using the approach of Kashyap and Stein (1995) to investigate the bank Zuzana Fungáčová, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill Does bank competition influence the lending channel in the euro area? 8 lending channel, where bank characteristics play a key role, one must adopt a bank-level measure of competition.
We also contribute to the literature by examining a period including the financial crisis, which allows us to check for the existence of an impact of bank competition on the bank lending channel in normal times and in turbulent times. Since the beginning of the crisis, banks' behavior might indeed have changed. However, few studies examine how the bank lending channel might have been modified during the crisis (Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011).
The impact of bank competition on the lending channel has broad implications for policymakers in the euro area. First, any evidence confirming an impact of bank competition on the effectiveness of monetary policy would plead for harmonization of bank competition levels across European countries, so that the single monetary policy would not have asymmetric effects. Second, such evidence could also motivate the fostering of bank competition. As mentioned above, the detrimental effects of bank competition on financial stability have raised concerns about the support of pro-competitive policies. But the finding that greater bank competition strengthens the transmission of monetary policy could be an additional reason to implement procompetitive policies in EU banking industries.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used to measure bank competition and to estimate the lending channel. Section 3 discusses the data and variables, section 4 presents the findings, and section 5 concludes.
Methodology

Lerner index
One of the main contributions of our study is that we employ a bank-level measure of competition that, unlike nation-wide measures, can be used to compare market power among different banks.
In general, the empirical approaches to measuring bank competition can be divided into two groups: traditional and new industrial organization (IO) methods. The traditional approach relies on the structure conduct performance (SCP) model that was widely used until the beginning of the 1990s. The SCP hypothesis is that banks in more concen- trated banking markets behave less competitively, which leads to higher bank profitability.
Thus, bank competition can be proxied by structural measures of market concentration such as the Herfindahl index or the market share of the n-largest banks in the system. Empirical studies however indicate that concentration is generally a poor measure of bank competition (Bikker et al., 2012) . The second approach, the so-called new empirical IO method, does not infer the degree of competition from indirect proxies such as market structure and market shares but rather aims to measure bank competition directly. The most widely used non-structural measures include the Lerner index and the Rosse-Panzar Hstatistic. Their usage might however be restricted due to a lack of the detailed data needed for their calculation. The Lerner index is calculated as the ratio of the difference between price of output and marginal cost to the price. The price of output is the average price of bank production proxied by total assets, defined as the ratio of total revenues to total assets. The marginal cost is estimated on the basis of a translog cost function with one output (total assets) and three input prices (price of labor, price of physical capital, and price of borrowed funds). We estimate one cost function using panel data with bank fixed effects in which we include time and country 4 dummy variables. Symmetry and linear homogeneity restrictions in input prices are imposed. The cost function is specified as follows: where TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w 1 the price of labor (ratio of personnel expenses to total assets) 5 , w 2 the price of physical capital (ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets), w 3 the price of borrowed funds (ratio of interest paid to customer deposits and short term funding). Total cost is the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses and interest paid. The indices for each bank are excluded from the presentation for the sake of simplicity. The estimated coefficients of the cost function from equation (1) are then used to derive the marginal cost (MC):
Once marginal cost is estimated and price of output computed, we calculate the Lerner index for each bank and thus obtain a direct measure of bank competition for the main estimations.
Lending channel
The current crisis has underlined the crucial role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy actions to lending for the real economy. It is widely acknowledged that monetary policy is transmitted via various channels to the real economy. The traditional interest-rate channel stresses the direct impact of interest rates on loan demand. Monetary tightening increases interest rates and therefore reduces demand for credit. The credit channel and the risk taking channel highlight the importance of financial intermediaries in the transmission of monetary policy actions to lending for the real economy. The credit channel is traditionally seen as amplifying the effects of the interest rate channel by influencing the supply of bank loans, whereas the risk taking channel acknowledges that monetary policy may also alter the quality of bank lending. The credit channel is generally divided into the 'broad credit channel' (including the asset-price channel), which stresses the effects of monetary policy actions on borrowers' net wealth, and the 'bank lending channel', which examines the effects of monetary policy on actions by depositary financial institutions (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) .
Following Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , the bank lending channel literature argues that monetary policy actions affect the balance-sheet structure of banks, causing changes in banks' loan supply in addition to causing changes in loan demand. The underlying assumption of the bank lending channel is that monetary tightening (loosening) drains (replenishes) banks' reserves and deposits and that this reduction (increase) in loanable funds causes banks to shrink (increase) their loan portfolios. If banks were able to costlessly compensate the loss in loanable funds by e.g. issuing new equity, the bank lending channel would shut down. This is hardly a plausible assumption, and much of the existing empirical literature points out that some banks may find it difficult to compensate for the loss of loanable funds and so may contract their lending (Peek and Rosengren, 2010).
To sort out the changes in loan supply from changes in loan demand, the literature has focused on micro-level evidence on cross-sectional differences between banks. The intuition is that, if changes in bank lending differ across bank types, the reason must be that different types of banks adjust their credit supply differently. The underlying assumption in the literature is that all banks face identical loan demand. This implies that loan demand does not depend on bank characteristics. For instance, if customers of small banks typically reduce their loan demands more than customers of large banks, when faced with an interest rate hike, identification of bank lending behavior becomes impossible. The assumption of homogeneous loan demand is thus crucial. As most customers have no short-term alternative to bank loan financing, this is usually taken as a fairly reasonable presumption, especially for bank-based financial systems like those of the euro area countries. We therefore focus solely on the euro area countries and on the period after 2000. As the great majority of euro area banks are not listed, we consider it appropriate to use a dataset as wide as possible to ensure a better picture of the whole banking system in the region.
Lending channel: the empirical model
The simple theoretical framework underlying the empirical model is developed by Ehrmann et al. (2001) and Ehrmann et al. (2003) . Following Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , the framework assumes that in equilibrium deposit (money) demand D equals money supply M and that money demand depends on monetary policy (mp) as follows:
γ represents all other factors that affect deposit demand beyond monetary policy. Loan demand depends on real GDP (y), price level (p) and the loan interest rate (r):
The supply of loans depends directly on the amount of loanable funds (deposits or money) D available, the loan interest rate r and the monetary policy stance (mp):
Monetary policy, typically approximated by a central bank's policy interest rate, enters the loan supply function both directly and indirectly. The direct link is the opportunity cost for a bank that uses interbank markets to finance loans. Secondly, the amount of deposits (or money) available depends negatively on the policy interest rate.
Following Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Ehrmann et al. (2001) , we assume that banks are not equally dependent on deposit finance. The impact of deposits on loan supply 
Assuming the loan market clears and applying the above equations, loan supply can be written as
Loan supply depends on the level of economic activity (y), price level (p), monetary policy stance (MP), individual bank-level characteristics (X i ) and the interaction of the last two ( ). In this framework a significant coefficient c 1 would imply the existence of a bank lending channel, i.e. that monetary policy affects bank loan supply.
Our empirical model is based on (7) and is estimated in first differences. 
Size is measured as log of total assets. Liquidity is the share of liquid assets in total assets, as defined by Bankscope. Capitalization is the bank's own-capital-to-total assets ratio, and the Lerner index is as described in the previous sub-section. All these variables are normalized with respect to their sample means. The size variable is normalized with respect to the sample mean for each period, in order to remove the constantly increasing trend in size.
Normalization implies that the average interaction term is zero, and the coefficients are directly interpretable as the average monetary policy effects on bank loan supply.
The preceding literature on European economies and emerging countries most often relies on central bank refinancing /repo rates or short-term money market interest rates as the indicator of monetary policy stance. 8 We follow this tradition in using the ECB overnight interbank rate (EONIA) as our main indicator of ECB monetary policy. The period of our study includes the financial crisis, during which changes in the overnight rate might have played a greater role than variations in the refinancing rate, which we employ in the robustness checks.
The dynamic equation (8) is typically estimated by the difference GMM method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . But in our case the results indicate that the lagged value of loan growth is not significant, which casts serious doubt on the benefits of using difference or system GMM. As we use annual, instead of higher frequency data, the result is not entirely surprising. There certainly can be convincing reasons why lending in the previous quarter may influence current lending, but it is much harder to find an economic rationale for why lending last year should influence current lending. As the lagged de-8 See Ehrmann et al (2003) , Gambacorta (2005) , Olivero, Li and Yeon (2011b).
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BOFIT Discussion Papers 17/ 2013 15 pendent variable is not statistically significant and we do not find a strong economic rationale for including the variable as a regressor, we prefer to estimate equation (10) without the lagged dependent variable in a standard fixed-effect panel regression framework.
where ∆= one-period change. The bank-specific variables X it (capitalization, size, liquidity and market power) are lagged one period to ease concerns about endogeneity.
Data
Our analysis is based on annual bank-level balance sheet and income statement data from All the countries in our sample implement the same monetary policy. The monetary policy rate that we use in the estimations is either the euro interbank overnight rate (EONIA) 9 or the main refinancing rate of the Eurosystem for robustness checks. Both of these are calculated as the average for a given year. Figure 1 displays the developments in these policy rates.
The data together with variables that describe the structure of the banking system in euro area countries are from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. The data on GDP and inflation are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators Database.
Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the estimations are presented in Table 1 . It is noteworthy that the mean Lerner index is 10.8%, which is of the same order of magnitude as that found in other studies reporting the Lerner value for EU banking in- 9 It is a measure of the effective interest rate prevailing in the euro interbank overnight market calculated as a weighted average of the interest rates on unsecured overnight lending transactions denominated in euro, as reported by a panel of contributing banks. 
Results
This section presents our results for the impact of bank competition on the transmission of monetary policy via the lending channel. We consider first the main estimations for the entire period of study, and then compare the results for before and during the crisis in order to analyze the impact of the crisis. Finally we provide some robustness tests.
Main results
The estimations for the full period are presented in Table 2 . Three different specifications are tested. The first column gives the results for the standard specification for studying the bank lending channel; we include capitalization, liquidity, size, and terms for their interactions with monetary policy.
In the second column, we add the Lerner index but limit the monetary-policy interaction terms to that with the Lerner index, to analyze its sign. In the third column, we add the monetary-policy interaction terms for the three standard bank characteristics (capitalization, liquidity, and size). Both of the latter two specifications provide evidence on the impact of bank competition on the bank lending channel. Our main findings are as follows.
First, we find evidence that the effect of monetary policy on loan growth has the expected negative sign. The coefficient for monetary policy is significant and negative in all estimations. An increase (decrease) in interest rates leads to a decrease (increase) in loan growth rate.
Second, the monetary-policy interaction terms for capitalization, liquidity are not significant, meaning that these bank-specific characteristics do not influence the way bank lending reacts to monetary-policy changes. As the bank lending channel predicts such different responses of bank lending among banks, our results do not support the existence of a bank lending channel in the euro area countries during the period of study.
These results are not completely at odds with the previous literature. When analyzing the other variables in our estimations, we note that wellcapitalized, highly-liquid and small banks achieve more robust loan growth. The coefficients of capitalization and liquidity are significant and positive; for size they are significant and negative in all the estimations. We further observe that changes in economic activity, measured by GDP growth, are positively related to loan growth.
4.2
The effect of the financial crisis Table 3 . We note several striking results. Second, the monetary-policy interaction terms for capitalization, liquidity and size are significant before the crisis but not significant during the crisis. We observe that wellcapitalized, highly liquid and smaller banks were better able to buffer their lending activity against shocks affecting the availability of funds before the crisis. These results provide some evidence for the bank lending channel before the crisis, using these bank-specific characteristics as indicators of the distributional effects of monetary policy. They also show that the channel was weakened during the crisis.
These findings moderate our conclusion on the absence of a bank lending channel for the full period, as they provide some evidence of the existence of a bank lending channel during normal times. Nonetheless, they also support the view that monetary policy has not been as effective during the crisis as it was before. Thus, the main conclusion from our estimations comparing the time periods before and during the crisis is that the bank lending channel was more effective before the crisis. The impact of monetary policy on loan growth was influenced by the differences across banks in market power, capitalization, size and liquidity only before the crisis.
This conclusion accords with a finding of Bech, Gambacorta and Kharroubi (2012) who, based on a dataset of 24 developed countries with data going back to 1960, find that monetary policy is less effective in a financial crisis. Their paper does not focus on the effectiveness of the bank lending channel and so has a different perspective than our work. However, their study provides interesting findings for our analysis of the impact of the crisis on the effectiveness of monetary policy. Namely, the main conclusion of their study is that monetary policy during an economic downturn that is associated with a financial crisis is less effective than during an economic downturn without such a crisis.
Robustness tests
We perform alternative estimations to examine whether our findings are robust over an alternative monetary-policy measure, and to our competition measure.
First, we use an alternative indicator for monetary policy: the refinancing rate of the ECB. As mentioned above, several different interest rates can be used to take account of monetary policy. Thus we aim to look at whether our results are robust to the indicator of monetary policy.
Tables 4 and 5 display the results with the refinancing rate as the monetary policy indicator. We present the results for the full period in Table 4 , and the separate periods (before and during the crisis) in Table 5 since the refinancing rate might have very different effects over time.
The results covering the full period are similar to those for the overnight rate. Bank concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index for assets and by the share of the five largest banks in total banking assets. Both measures are computed at the country level, and the results are displayed in Table 6 . From an economic perspective, more integration among euro area countries should contribute to the harmonizing of bank competition levels. As long as substantial cross-country differences persist, the single monetary policy will have asymmetric effects.
Monetary policy changes can thus have heterogeneous real effects across euro area countries which may be a cause for concern among monetary policy decision-makers.
The lesson to take form this is that banking integration cannot be considered separately but must be treated in combination with euro-area monetary integration. As a consequence, efforts to enhance convergence in bank competition can be considered a fundamental step to further improve the monetary policy framework in the euro area. Tables and figure   Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the main variables Panel estimations with bank fixed effects. Dependent variable is the loan growth rate. The monetary policy variable is the difference in overnight interbank rates in the current versus the previous period. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
MP (refinancing rate) 0.000 −0.000 0.000 Panel estimations with bank fixed effects. Dependent variable is the loan growth rate. The monetary policy variable is the difference in refinancing rates in the current versus the previous period. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level.
Zuzana Fungáčová, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill Does bank competition influence the lending channel in the euro area? 30 Table 6 Robustness check: alternative measures of competition Panel estimations with bank fixed effects. Dependent variable is the loan growth rate. The monetary policy variable is the difference in overnight interbank rates in the current versus the previous period. Competition measure is either Herfindahl index or concentration ratio accounting for the share of the five largest banks in the banking system assets in each country. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. Specifications (2) and (3) introduced in Table 2 are estimated. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
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